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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the court of appeals' decision 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §79A-3-102(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE #1: Was Robert Oltmanns' claim on his homeowners insurance policy 
fairly debatable as a matter of law? This was the only issue on which this Court granted 
the Petition for Certiorari as set forth in its July 8, 2016 Order. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On a writ of certiorari, this Court reviews the 
decision of the court of appeals and applies "the same standard of review used by the 
court of appeals." Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, ,r 8, 27 P.3d 538. "The correctness of the· 
court of appeals' decision turns on whether it accurately reviewed the trial court's 
decision under the appropriate standard of review." Id. "Whether an insured's claim is 
fairly debatable under a given set of facts is ... a question of law." Jones v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 2012 UT 52, 16,286 P.3d 301. However, because of"the complexity and variety 
of facts upon which the fairly debatable determination depends, the legal standard under 
which this determination is made conveys some discretion to trial judges." Id. "Although 
we will carefully review a trial court's conclusion that an insured's claim is or is not fairly 
debatable, we will grant the trial court's conclusion some deference." Id. "The trial 
court's application of law to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion." Aris Vision 
Inst., Inc. v. Wasatch Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 2005 UT App 326, if 16, 121 P.3d 24, 28 aff'd, 
2006 UT 45, 116, 143 P.3d 278. 
1 
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ISSUE #2: Was the trial court's grant of summary judgment proper when no 
genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the conduct of Fire Insurance in handling 
Oltmanns' claim?l 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary judgment shall be granted if"there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and [ if] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "In determining whether the trial court correctly 
found that there were no genuine issues of material fact, [ this Court views] the facts and 
all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." 
Neiderhauser Builders and Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, summary judgment on the fairly 
debatable issue "should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is no reasonable ii 
probability that the party moved against could prevail." Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2012 
UT 52 atiJ 8. 
This Court stated that summary judgment is not precluded simply whenever some 
fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted. Hegler 
Branch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980). In cases such as this, where 
the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, if the movant shows through 
pleadings, depositions, and other evidence that there are no issues of material fact, and 
judgment on the law is proper, the burden shifts to the non-moving party, "who may not 
1 To the extent this Court considers Issues# 2 and# 3 as set forth by Robert Oltmanns, 
Fire Insurance submits that Issue #2 is framed more appropriately as detailed in the 
Respondent's brief. 
2 
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rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings," to present evidence, beyond 
bare pleadings, to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 
UT 2, ,r 18, 177 P .3d 600 (2008). 
In addition, mere inferences are not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. 
Any inferences must be taken from "material" facts, and furthermore, those inferences 
must establish a "genuine" issue. 
Summary judgment requires only that there is "no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." The word "genuine" indicates that a district court is not required to 
draw every possible inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable, 
in favor of the nonmoving party. Instead, it is required to draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party .... 
IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D &K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ,r 19, 196 P.3d 588 (emphasis 
added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE and COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner Robert Oltmanns (hereinafter "Oltmanns") and Brady Blackner were 
involved in an accident that occurred on July 11, 2006, when Oltmanns was the operator 
of a Honda F-12 AquaTrax personal watercraft. (R. at 2.) Oltmanns was towing a tube on 
which Brady Blackner was riding. (R. at 2.) The tube collided with a rock, resulting in 
injury to Brady Blackner's leg. (R. at 2.) Thereafter, Brady Blackner sued Oltmanns for 
damages that resulted from the alleged negligence of Oltmanns in the accident. (R. at 2.) 
The case was titled Brady Blackner v. Keith Joseph Caserio, Robert Allen Oltmanns, et 
3 
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al., Davis County Civil No. 070700309 (hereinafter "Blackner lawsuit"). (R. at 2.) At the 
time of the accident, Oltmanns was insured under a homeowners policy issued by Fire 
Insurance Exchange ("Fire Insurance"). (R. at 2.) In September 2006, Fire Insurance 
agent, Sherrie Eichmeier, offered to assist Oltmanns in filing a claim on his homeowners 
insurance policy for the accident. (R. at 500.) Oltmanns declined this offer. (R. at 500.) In 
2009, more than three years after the accident, Oltmanns made a claim under his 
homeowners policy and tendered the defense of the lawsuit brought against him by Brady 
Blackner, claiming the suit was covered under the liability section of the homeowners 
insurance policy issued by Fire Insurance. (R. at 500.) 
After Oltmanns made a claim on his homeowners insurance policy for defense of 
the Blackner lawsuit, Fire Insurance thoroughly investigated the facts and fairly evaluated 
the circumstances to determine if the claim made by Oltmanns was covered under his 
homeowners policy. (R. at 501-05.) In reviewing the language of Oltmanns' homeowners 
insurance policy, Fire Insurance noted an exclusion for bodily injury resulting from the 
use of jet skis. (R. at 2-3.) In December 2009, due to the language in Oltmanns' 
homeowners insurance policy and without denying Oltmanns' claim, Fire Insurance filed ~ 
a declaratory relief action to have the court determine the rights and responsibilities of the 
parties as they related to the language in Oltmanns' homeowners insurance policy. (R. at 
1--4, 501-05.) Fire Insurance moved for summary judgment to have the trial court declare 
Oltmanns' accident was not covered by the homeowners insurance policy. (R. at 29-80.) 
4 
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The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Fire Insurance, concluding 
that the term 'jet skis" in Oltmanns' homeowners insurance policy included the Honda F-
12 AquaTrax personal watercraft which Oltmanns was operating when the accident 
occurred. (R. at 181-83.) Oltmanns and Brady Blackner appealed the trial court's 
decision. (R. at 184--85.) The Court of Appeals reversed finding the term 'jet skis" was 
ambiguous, "even discounting the bizarre possibility that [ the term] meant to refer only to 
one Kawasaki watercraft model." (R. at 211-22.) The Court of Appeals concluded that 
the language in the homeowners policy was not effective to exclude coverage for 
Oltmanns' accident. (R. at 217.) Thereafter, Fire Insurance immediately accepted 
coverage and settled the Blackner lawsuit on behalf of Oltmanns.2 (R. at 504.) 
Thereafter, in 2013, Oltmanns filed his First Amended Counterclaim against Fire 
Insurance seeking an award of attorney's fees and costs from defending the declaratory 
judgment action. (R. at 226, 244.) Fire Insurance filed a Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings. (R. at 352-62.) The Court denied Fire Insurance's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings and converted it to a Motion for a More Definite Statement, pursuant to Rule 
12(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which was granted. (R. at 398-400.) 
Thereafter, Oltmanns filed his Second Amended Counterclaim. (R. at 403-08.) Fire 
Insurance answered the Second Amended Counterclaim denying the claims for relief in 
their entirety. (R. at 412-19.) The parties proceeded to discovery, which included 
2 The Court of Appeals incorrectly states that "A year later, the brother-in-law sued 
Oltmanns for negligence and won, obtaining a judgment against him." Fire Ins. Exch. v. 
Oltmanns, 2016 UT App 54, ,r 3. The Blackner Lawsuit was settled prior to any judgment 
5 
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interrogatories and requests for production of documents, but no depositions. (R. at 458, 
464, 484.) Initially, fact discovery was to be completed by February 28, 2014 (R. at 435-
36), however, the parties stipulated to extend fact discovery an additional 60 days until 
April 30, 2014. (R. at 480-81.) 
After discovery ended, Fire Insurance filed a motion for summary judgment that 
Oltmanns' claim was fairly debatable as a matter oflaw. (R. at 494-626.) After a hearing 
on the motion, the trial court granted Fire Insurance's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
concluding that Oltmanns' claim was fairly debatable as a matter oflaw.3 (R. at 863-73.) 
Oltmanns appealed the trial court's order on October 20, 2014. (R. at 876.) The court of 
appeals affirmed the trial court's order. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Oltmanns, 2016 UT App 54, 
370 P.3d 566. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS 
The trial court concluded that Fire Insurance, in relation to the claim made by 
Brady Blackner against Oltmanns, diligently investigated the facts to determine if the 
claim was valid. (R. at 863-73.) The trial court found Fire Insurance fairly evaluated the 
claim. (R. at 863-73.) The trial court concluded Fire Insurance acted promptly and 
reasonably by first filing a declaratory relief action and ultimately settling the claim 
against Robert Oltmanns on his behalf. (R. at 863-73.) This included paying Oltmanns' 
being entered. The case was then dismissed. 
3 The trial court allowed Fire Insurance to withdraw its separate motion to dismiss based 
on the statute of limitations. Oltmanns' counterclaim was filed beyond the three-year 
statute of limitations as found in Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-313. The trial court allowed 
the motion to dismiss to be withdrawn without prejudice. (R. at 850, 872.) 
6 
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legal fees and costs in defending the Blackner lawsuit. (R. at 863-73.) The trial court 
concluded that Fire Insurance was faced with a fairly debatable question surrounding the 
coverage of Brady Blaclmer's claims against Oltmanns. (R. at 863-73.) The trial court 
concluded the definition of "jet skis" as found in Oltmanns' homeowners insurance policy 
presented a fairly debatable claim. (R. at 863-73.) 
Thus, the trial court concluded Fire Insurance was entitled to seek a declaratory 
judgment as to its obligations to Oltmanns and its duties under the insurance contract. (R. 
at 863-73.) The trial court, therefore, concluded that Fire Insurance did not breach the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to Oltmanns. (R. at 863-73 .) 
Further, the trial court concluded that Fire Insurance did not breach the insurance contract 
with Oltmanns. (R. at 863-73.) Just the opposite, the trial court concluded that Fire 
Insurance continually acted in good faith and performed its duties under the homeowners 
insurance contract with Oltmanns. (R. at 863-73.) 
Therefore, the trial court granted Fire Insurance's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and dismissed Oltmanns' causes of action as found in Oltmanns' Second Amended 
Counterclaim. (R. at 863-73.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, concluding 
that "an insurance company may reasonably and fairly rely ... upon a coverage opinion 
from qualified outside counsel, received in the course of careful investigation and 
evaluation of a claim. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Oltmanns, 2016 UT App 54,115,370 P.3d 
566. The Court of Appeals went on and concluded that "submitting the issue to a court for 
interpretation in declaratory judgment action is a prudent, reasonable step toward the 
7 
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resolution of a legitimate dispute over a coverage term or exclusion. Oltmanns, 2016 UT 
App 54,115. 
STATEMENTS OF FACT 
The Petitioner has not identified any statements of fact actually considered by the 
trial court. Rather, Petitioner's statement of facts read as additional argument that do not 
reflect the facts of this matter. The following statements of fact are necessary for a court 
to consider the conduct of the insurer and to allow the trial court deference when making 
a fairly debatable determination. 
1. This action concerns a policy of homeowners insurance issued by Fire Insurance to ~ 
Oltmanns. (R. at 2.) 
2. Oltmanns was sued by Brady Blackner for injuries he sustained while Oltmanns 
was operating a Honda F-12 AquaTrax personal watercraft in Case No. 
070700309. (R. at 2.) 
3. In September 2006, Oltmanns went to his insurance agent, Sherrie Eichmeier, to 
inquire about his homeowners insurance policy. (R. at 533-35.) 
4. In September 2006, Oltmanns and Sherrie Eichmeier read the exclusions in 
Oltmanns' homeowners insurance policy. Both Oltmanns and Sherrie Eicbmeier 
thought that Oltmanns' accident that occurred on July 11, 2006, was probably not 
covered due to the language contained in the exclusion regarding "jet skis." (R. at 
533-35.) 
8 
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5. Sherrie Eichmeier told Oltmanns the only way to determine if coverage was 
provided under his homeowners policy for his July 11, 2006, accident was to 
submit a formal claim on his homeowners insurance policy so that an investigation 
could be conducted. (R .. at 533-35.) 
6. Sherrie Eichmeier offered to assist Oltmanns in making a formal claim on his 
homeowners insurance policy so that a formal investigation could be conducted on 
Oltmanns' July 11, 2006 accident, to see if coverage was available. (R. at 533-35.) 
7. Robert Oltmanns declined Sherrie Eicbmeier's offer to assist him in making a 
formal claim on his homeowners insurance policy for the July 11, 2006 accident. 
(R. at 533-35.) 
8. In September 2006, Robert Oltmanns decided he did not want to make a claim on 
his homeowners insurance policy to see if coverage was provided for his July 11, 
2006, accident. (R. at 533-35.) 
9. Robert Oltmanns never asked Sherrie Eichmeier to assist him in making a formal 
claim on his homeowners insurance policy in September 2006 to determine if his 
July 11, 2006, accident was covered under his homeowners insurance policy. (R. at 
533-35.) 
10. The Blaclmer lawsuit was filed against Oltmanns the following year in June 2007. 
(R. at 403.) 
9 
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11. On August 26, 2009, Oltmanns tendered defense of Blackner v. Caserio, Case No. 
070700309, Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah, to Fire 
Insurance. (R. at 403, 538, 543.) 
12. The next day on August 27, 2009, Shawn Stephens, Litigation Claims Specialist 
for Fire Insurance, contacted Oltmanns' counsel, Don Dalton, to discuss the 
language of Oltmanns' homeowners insurance policy. (R. at 537--41.) 
13. Shawn Stephens told Mr. Dalton that if Oltmanns was seeking coverage for the 
accident that occurred on July 11, 2006, that Fire Insurance would complete a 
thorough investigation of the loss and how coverage would potentially apply. (R. 
at 537-41, 545.) 
14. Shawn Stephens specifically told Don Dalton that his email on August 27, 2009, 
was not to be misconstrued as a denial of any kind, regarding Oltmanns' insurance 
claim due to the accident. (R. 545). 
15. In response to Shawn Stephens' August 27, 2009 email, Mr. Dalton informed Fire 
Insurance that Oltmanns was making a claim on his homeowners insurance policy. 
(R. 537-41, 548). 
16. Starting the next day on August 28, 2009, Fire Insurance began a coverage 
investigation and evaluation regarding the accident in July of 2006 that involved 
Oltmanns. Shawn Stephens, in conducting the investigation and evaluation, 
requested and received the summons and complaint filed against Oltmanns (Case 
No. 070700309), the cross-claim against Oltmanns from the rental companies, a 
10 
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copy of the rental agreement for the personal watercraft, and the deposition 
transcript of Robert Oltmanns regarding the facts of the accident. (R. at 537--41, 
551.) 
17. It took several weeks for Fire Insurance to obtain the necessary documents needed 
to complete a coverage investigation and evaluation. (R. at 53 7-41.) 
18. Fire Insurance held a meeting in the claims litigation department, which included 
supervisors, about Oltmanns' claim and demand for coverage. As a result of the 
meeting, Fire Insurance decided to send the matter to outside counsel for a 
coverage opinion. (R. at 537-41.) 
19. Oltmanns made the following statement of additional fact (No. 1), which was 
based on Fire Insurance's response to Oltmanns' interrogatories: "Before sending 
the claim for a coverage evaluation, Plaintiff determined that it needed a copy of 
the vehicle title and registration at the time of the accident to determine how the 
jetski [sic] is classified. Plaintiff wanted to know if the vehicle was classified as a 
'watercraft."' The claim summary log stated, "This information is needed before 
sending out for coverage opinion [sic]." However, the vehicle title and registration 
were not secured. Fire Insurance objected on the same basis that it objected to the 
interrogatories. At the same time, Fire Insurance repeated the complete answer it 
gave to the interrogatories: "Fire Insurance Exchange did not need said 
information prior to sending the matter out for a coverage opinion. However, said 
information may have assisted coverage counsel in understanding how the Honda 
11 
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F-12 personal watercraft was classified. In addition, the registration may have 
provided technical language, including to whom the watercraft was registered to. 
Fire Insurance Exchange sought to provide coverage counsel with as much 
information as possible within the time constraints. It was determined that the 
identified information would be helpful, but it was not felt to be critical. If 
coverage counsel felt the information was essential for a coverage opinion, 
additional efforts to obtain said information would have been made." (R. at 667-
68, 674--81.) 
20. On November 20, 2009, Fire Insurance sent a copy of their file to coverage 
counsel for a coverage opinion as to whether the July 2006 accident was a covered 
occurrence under Oltmanns' policy. The documents Fire Insurance sent to 
coverage counsel for the coverage opinion included: the summons and complaint 
against Oltmanns in case no. 070700309; the filed answers to the complaint for 
case no. 070700309; a copy of the rental agreement for the personal watercraft; 
Oltmanns' Deposition transcript detailing the facts of the accident; and 
correspondence with Mr. Dalton. (R. at 537-41, 555-56.) 
21. On November 20, 2009, Fire Insurance also sent a letter to Don Dalton to inform 
him that the matter was sent to outside counsel for a coverage opinion. Fire 
Insurance asked Mr. Dalton to continue defending Oltmanns and told him that in 
the event coverage was extended for the July 2006 accident, Fire Insurance would 
reimburse him for the costs and fees incurred by Oltmanns. (R. 539, 558). 
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22. On December 11, 2009, Fire Insurance received the coverage opinion from 
coverage counsel. Coverage counsel indicated a general search of court cases 
found that many courts referred to various brands of personal watercrafts as jet 
skis. Coverage counsel indicated that Wikipedia and Google showed that the term 
"jet ski" was often used as a generic term for all personal watercraft. Based on 
coverage counsel's research regarding the term ')et ski," he believed that Fire 
Insurance had a 7 5% chance of prevailing in a declaratory relief action. In the 
coverage opinion, coverage counsel sought authorization to file a declaratory relief 
action. (R. at 540, 560-79.) 
23. Fire Insurance relies on outside counsel to assist in making coverage 
determinations if there is a question regarding the language of an insuring 
agreement. (R. at 750.) 
24. On December 14, 2009, Fire Insurance authorized coverage counsel to file the 
declaratory relief action. (R. at 540.) 
25. The declaratory relief action was filed on December 18, 2009. (R. at 2.) 
26. Fire Insurance moved for summary judgment on the declaratory judgment action. 
(R. at 29-80.) The trial court granted summary judgment for Fire Insurance, 
declaring there was no coverage for Oltmanns' accident. (R. at 181-83.) Oltmanns 
appealed the declaration that there was no coverage for the accident. (R. at 184.) 
The Court of Appeals reversed finding the term ''jet skis" was ambiguous, "even 
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discounting the bizarre possibility that [ the term] meant to refer only to one 
Kawasaki watercraft model." (R. at 211-22.) 
27. Oltmanns' homeowners insurance policy, which is at issue in this matter, does not 
provide attorney's fees for Oltmanns for representation against Fire Insurance 
when Fire Insurance files a declaratory relief action. (R. at 5 81-619.) 
28. In 2013, Oltmanns filed a counterclaim and subsequently a Second Amended 
Counterclaim, seeking damages for alleged breach of contract and the alleged 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Specifically, 
Oltmanns alleged "Plaintiff did not fairly evaluate the claim, and unreasonably 
rejected it, in violation of Utah law, thus breaching the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing." In addition, Oltmanns alleged he was entitled to attorney's 
fees and damages for "severe emotional distress caused by the coverage 
denial .... " (R. at 403.) 
29. Oltmanns never sought nor received any medical treatment for his alleged severe 
emotional distress. (R. at 621-26.) 
30.After the Court of Appeals remanded this case to the district court, Fire Insurance 
settled the underlying claims against Defendant Oltmanns. The Blaclmer lawsuit 
was dismissed on October 30, 2012. (R. at 403.) 
31. Fire Insurance reimbursed Oltmanns for his costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
the defense of the Blackner lawsuit. (R. at 403.) 
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32. No party requested a jury trial nor did any party pay the jury fee as required by law. 
Therefore, the trial court is the trier of fact in the matter. (R. at 2, 9, 19, 23.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the granting of Fire Insurance's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Under Rule 56, summary judgment shall be granted only if "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and [if] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter oflaw." Here, Oltmmans failed to show that genuine issues of material fact exist. 
Oltmanns' claim regarding his 2006 watercraft accident was fairly debatable as a matter 
of law. Fire Insurance diligently investigated the facts, evaluated the claim fairly and 
acted promptly and reasonably by filing a declaratory relief action. Fire Insurance's 
reliance on coverage counsel's opinion and advice was reasonable. Furthermore, Fire 
Insurance continued to show its good faith by accepting coverage and settling the 
Blaclmer lawsuit when the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment. Fire Insurance also reimbursed Oltmanns for the legal fees and costs incurred 
in defending the Blackner lawsuit. Thus, Oltmanns' claims of breach of contract and 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fail as a matter oflaw. 
In addition, the trial court properly rejected Oltmanns' Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(f) 
declaration. The declaration was filed after discovery ended and even after the parties 
extended discovery. The declaration presented no facts. Oltmanns chose not to depose 
coverage counsel during the discovery period and Oltmanns' declaration that the 
deposition of coverage counsel was necessary was untimely, conclusory, and based upon 
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purely speculative facts. Thus, the trial court properly rejected the declaration and denied 
Oltmanns' request to depose coverage counsel. 
For these reasons, this Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment. The 
court of appeals was correct in affirming the decision of the trial court which concluded 
that Oltmanns' claim was fairly debatable as a matter oflaw. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE ROBERT 
OLTMANNS' CLAIMS ARE FAIRLY DEBATABLE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
Fire Insurance is entitled to summary judgment on Oltmanns' breach of contract 
and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims. The implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing "inheres in all contractual relationships." Prince v. 
Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ,r 27, 56 P.3d 524. "In the first-party insurance 
context, this implied covenant of good faith performance contemplates, at the very least, 
that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine whether a 
claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and 
reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim." Id. "[If] an insurer denies an insured's claim 
that is fairly debatable, then the insurer is entitled to debate it and cannot be held to have 
breached the implied covenant if it chooses to do so." Id. ,r 28. "This is because the duties 
imposed by the implied covenant of good faith plainly indicate that the overriding 
requirement imposed ... is that insurers act reasonably, as an objective matter, in dealing 
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with their insured." Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2012 UT 52, ,r 7,286 P.3d 301 (internal 
citations omitted). 
"When a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate it, whether the 
debate concerns a matter of fact or law." Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co . ., 745 P.2d 838, 
842 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added); see also 14 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. 
Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d § 204:28 (1999) ("A 'debatable reason,' for purposes of 
determining whether a first-party insurer may be subjected to bad-faith liability, means an 
arguable reason, a reason that is open to dispute or question."). In this case, the debate 
concerned the interpretation of the term ')et skis" in Oltmanns' homeowners policy and 
how it applied to the July 2006 accident. "Interpretation of an insurance contract presents 
a question oflaw." Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 2006 UT App 500, ,r 7, 153 P.3d 
798. "Therefore, an insurer cannot be held to have breached the covenant of good faith on 
the ground that it wrongfully denied coverage if the insured's claim, although later found 
to be proper, was fairly debatable at the time it was denied." Jones, 2012 UT 52, ,r 7,286 
P.3d 301 (internal citations omitted). 
A. Oltmanns' Claim Was Fairly Debatable As A Matter Of Law Because 
The Interpretation of "Jet Skis" in Oltmanns' Policy Presented A 
Fairly Debatable Issue. 
Fire Insurance acted continually in good faith while investigating Oltmanns' claim 
and in the filing of the declaratory judgment action. Oltmanns' claim was fairly debatable, 
and therefore, Fire Insurance was justified in filing a declaratory judgment action to 
determine its rights and obligations under the contract of insurance. 
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"An analysis of whether an insurance claim is fairly debatable is closely related to 
an analysis of whether an insurer fulfilled its duty ... to evaluate the claim fairly." Jones 
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2012 UT 52,112,286 PJd 301. In Jones, this Court stated: 
When making the determination of whether a claim is fairly debatable, a 
judge should remain mindful of an insurer's implied duties to diligently 
investigate claims, evaluate them fairly, and act reasonably and promptly 
in settling or denying claims. Only when there is a legitimate factual 
issue as to the validity of the insured's claim, such that reasonable minds 
could not differ as to whether the insurer's conduct measured up to the 
required standard of care, should the court grant judgment as a matter of 
law. 
Id. ( emphasis added) (internal quotation, citation omitted). "Interpretation of an 
insurance contract presents a question of law." Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 2006 
UT App 500, 17, 153 P.3d 798. Thus, Fire Insurance was entitled to set forth its position 
in relation to the ')et skis" exclusion contained in Oltmanns' policy of insurance in the 
declaratory judgment action. This conduction was reasonable and permitted by Utah law. 
"When an insurance company proceeds in a reasonable way to resolve a difficult 
coverage question, its eventual loss at the appellate level does not foreclose a 
determination that an issue of interpretation was fairly debatable." Fire Ins. Exch. v. 
Oltmanns, 2016 UT App 54,115,370 P.3d 566. Such is the case here. Such was the case 
in Western United Insurance Company v. Heighton, No. 2:14CV435DAK, 2016 WL 
4916785, at *4, n.3 (D. Utah Sept. 14, 2016), wherein the court concluded that the 
interpretation of an "earth movement" exclusion in a policy of insurance presented a 
fairly debatable claim. Thus, the insurance company did not contravene the implied 
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing by debating the language of the policy and filing a 
declaratory judgment action. See id. 
Oltmanns' claim was fairly debatable because the facts and circumstances of the 
accident along with the policy language and the meaning of "jet skis" presented an issue 
which Fire Insurance was entitled to debate. Therefore, Fire Insurance was justified in 
filing a declaratory judgment action to determine its rights and obligations under the 
contract. Under Utah law, "A person with an interest in a ... written contract, or whose 
rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a ... contract ... may request the 
district court to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the ... 
contract ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-6-408 (2008). "When faced with a decision as to whether to defend or refuse 
to defend, an insurer is entitled to seek a declaratory judgment as to its obligations and 
rights." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231,237 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). 
Where the Plaintiff (insurer) merely states its position and initiates a declaratory relief 
action for "determination of ... a justiciable controversy, it would not comport with our 
ideas of either law or justice to prevent any party who entertains a bona fide question 
about his legal obligations from seeking adjudication thereon in the courts." W. Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423,427 (1980). Trial courts are granted some discretion 
in deciding whether a claim is fairly debatable, "because of the complexity and variety of 
the facts upon which the fairly debatable determination depends." Prince v. Bear River 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ,r 33, 56 P .3d 524. 
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In two notable cases, Utah appellate courts have upheld grants of summary 
judgment in favor of insurers on fairly debatable grounds. In Prince, a PIP insurance 
claim was fairly debatable as a matter of law when a doctor retained by the insurance 
company opined that some of the medical bills claimed were for treatment of an unrelated 
condition. 2002 UT 68, ,r,r 35-36. The doctor opined in the case and stated, "I do not 
think that the chiropractic care exceeding 12 weeks was medically necessary." Prince, 
2002 UT 68, ,r 4 (emphasis added). This is similar to coverage counsel stating there was a 
7 5% chance of summary judgment being granted regarding the coverage issue. 
In Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), a denial of Ci> 
a claim under a homeowners policy was fairly debatable where the insured had been 
bound over for trial on criminal charges of arson and insurance fraud, even though the 
insured was eventually acquitted, and where the insurance company's retained 
investigator determined that arson was the cause of the fire. Id. at 842. The Callioux court 
reasoned that an "expert's report generally provides a good faith basis for an insurer's 
defense of a bad faith claim." Id. In Callioux, the insurer conducted its own investigation 
by hiring an arson expert. Id. at 839. The arson expert concluded that the loss was of 
incendiary origin and caused by the insured, David Callioux. Id. As a result, the insurer 
denied the claim. Id. Although the trial of Cailloux resulted in acquittal to the arson 
charges, the insurance company's prompt payment following the verdict was indicative 
that the insurance company had denied the claim in good faith. Id. at 840. 
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The Calliouxs filed suit against Progressive for breach of contract and breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 839. The trial court granted 
Progressive' s motion for summary judgment, despite Calliouxs' counsel asking to depose 
the arson expert pursuant to Rule 56(f) before the court ruled on the summary judgment 
motion and the Calliouxs appealed. Id. at 840. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment stating, "If the evidence presented creates a 
factual issue as to the claim's validity, there exists a debatable reason for denial, thereby 
legitimizing the denial of the claim, and eliminating the bad faith claim." Id. at 842. 
Furthermore, the court of appeals concluded that "an expert's report generally provides a 
good faith basis for an insurer's defense of a bad faith claim." Id. The court reasoned that 
the claim was fairly debatable as indicated by a judicial finding of probable cause when 
David Callioux was bound over for trial for arson and insurance fraud. Id. Finally, the 
Court concluded that a "final indication of Progressive's lack of bad faith in denying the 
Calliouxs' claim is that, upon David Callioux' s acquittal for arson and insurance fraud, 
Progressive immediately paid the claim in full." Id. 
In the case at hand, Oltmanns' claim presented a similar legitimate factual (the 
circumstances of the accident) and legal issue (the meaning of the ''jet skis" exclusion) as 
to whether his homeowners policy covered his accident. This is a case where legitimate 
factual and legal issues show that Oltmanns' claim was fairly debatable as a matter of 
law. Specifically, the meaning of the exclusion for ''jet skis" was at issue both factually 
and legally. Similar to Callioux, after thoroughly investigating the facts and relying in 
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good faith upon a thorough coverage opinion provided by outside counsel, Fire Insurance 
decided to file the declaratory relief action. Relying on a coverage opinion by seasoned 
coverage counsel is the same as relying on a doctor for the reasonableness of treatment or 
relying on an arson expert to determine a fire was intentionally set. 
The declaratory relief action was filed only after Fire Insurance investigated the 
facts of the accident by obtaining the documents related to the accident, including the 
summons and complaint filed against Oltmanns (Case No. 070700309), the rental 
companies' cross-claim against Oltmanns, a copy of the rental agreement for the personal 
watercraft, and the deposition transcript of Robert Oltmanns regarding the facts of the 
accident in the Blaclmer lawsuit. Fire Insurance communicated directly with Oltmanns' 
attorney, Mr. Dalton, throughout this process. 
On November 20, 2009, Fire Insurance sent a letter to Mr. Dalton to inform him 
that the matter was sent to outside counsel for a coverage opinion. Fire Insurance asked 
Mr. Dalton to continue defending Oltmanns and told him that in the event coverage was 
extended for the July 2006 accident, Fire Insurance would reimburse him for the costs and 
fees incurred by Oltmanns. Oltmanns provides no case law or citation which supports his 
argument that Fire Insurance was required to accept the defense of Blackner lawsuit. 
Ultimately, Fire Insurance paid for all of Oltmanns' costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
the Blackner lawsuit, in addition to settling the Blaclmer lawsuit on behalf of Oltmanns. 
Any argument that Fire Insurance should have or was required to assume the defense for a 
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fairly debatable claim prior to the court determining its obligations under the contract is 
incorrect. Fire Insurance fulfilled its obligations as set forth in the contract for insurance. 
Coverage counsel determined that Fire Insurance had a 75% chance of prevailing 
in a declaratory relief action. This determination was made after extensive research of 
case law nationwide and the use of the term ')et skis" as well as the plain and ordinary 
usage of the term "jet skis." Similar to the court's finding in Callioux of a fairly debatable 
claim based on probable cause, the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Fire 
Insurance regarding coverage prior to the appeal demonstrates that Oltmanns' claim was 
fairly debatable. The trial court concluded that the "jet skis" exclusion in Oltmanns' 
policy included the Honda F-12 AquaTrax personal watercraft which Oltmanns was 
operating when the accident occurred. The Court of Appeals recognized this fact by 
stating, "we find it very persuasive that the district court initially accepted Fire 
Insurance's theory and argument in this case, i.e., in the first round of judicial 
consideration, not only was there a debate, but Fire Insurance actually won the debate." 
Fire Ins. Exch. v. Oltmanns, 2016 UT App 54, 113. Thus, this fairly debatable issue 
eliminates Oltmanns' bad faith claim. Fire Insurance's good faith was further 
demonstrated by its decision to file a declaratory judgment action with the promise to pay 
if coverage was extended, instead of simply denying Olnnanns' claim. Immediately 
following the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment to 
Fire Insurance, Fire Insurance accepted coverage. Fire Insurance paid the claim on behalf 
of Oltmanns and the Blaclmer lawsuit was settled and dismissed. In addition, Fire 
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Insurance payed all of Oltmanns' costs and attorney's fees for defending the Blackner 
lawsuit. These facts are undisputed. 
Oltmanns takes issue with Fire Insurance's response to Oltmanns' interrogatories: 
"Before sending the claim for a coverage evaluation, Plaintiff determined that it needed a 
copy of the vehicle title and registration at the time of the accident to determine how the 
j etski [sic] is classified. Plaintiff wanted to know if the vehicle was classified as a 
'watercraft."' The claim summary log stated, "This information is needed before sending 
out for coverage opinion [sic]." However: 
Fire Insurance Exchange did not need said information prior to sending 
the matter out for a coverage opinion. Said inf01n1ationmay have assisted 
coverage counsel in understanding how the Honda F-12 personal 
watercraft was classified. In addition, the registration may have provided 
technical language, including to whom the watercraft was registered to. 
Fire Insurance Exchange sought to provide coverage counsel with as much 
information as possible within the time constraints. It was determined that 
the identified information would be helpful, but it was not felt to be 
critical. If coverage counsel felt the inf01n1ation was essential for a 
coverage opinion, additional efforts to obtain said information would have 
been made. 
(R. at 735.) 
Ultimately, the vehicle registration was not obtained by Fire Insurance before 
sending the matter to coverage counsel. Coverage counsel did not say the registration was 
needed for his coverage opinion. By this time (late 2009), over three years had passed 
since the July 2006 accident. Fire Insurance sought to diligently investigate the claim, 
evaluate it fairly, and act reasonably and promptly in settling or denying claims. See Jones 
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2012 UT 52, ,I 12,286 P.3d 301 (emphasis added). In seeking to 
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promptly resolve the coverage issue, Fire Insurance provided coverage counsel with as 
much information as possible within time constraints. Speculating about what the 
registration may have contained three years prior to Oltmanns' claim is irrelevant. It 
creates no issue of fact. Rather, had coverage counsel felt the information essential for its 
coverage opinion, additional efforts would have been made to acquire the registration. To 
suggest that this would have substantially changed coverage counsel's opinion or advice 
is speculative at best. Moreover, "because of the complexity and variety of facts upon 
which the fairly debatable detennination depends, the legal standard under which this 
detennination is made conveys some discretion to trial judges." 2012 UT 52, ,r 6. Here, 
the trial court used its discretion to detennine that speculating about what the registration 
may have contained three years prior created no genuine issue of fact. 
Oltmanns acknowledged and conceded that Fire Insurance conducted an 
investigation regarding Oltmanns' July 2006 watercraft accident.4 It was undisputed by 
Oltmanns that in September 2006, Fire Insurance offered to help Oltmanns file a claim on 
bis homeowners insurance policy so that a formal investigation could be conducted 
regarding his July 2006 watercraft accident. Oltmanns declined this offer. Therefore, Fire 
Insurance did not deny any claim made by Oltmanns in 2006 because no claim was made. 
Rather, Oltmanns first tendered defense to Fire Insurance and made a claim on his 
homeowners policy in 2009. Thereafter, Fire Insurance immediately contacted Oltmanns 
to inform him that a thorough investigation of the loss would be conducted to detennine 
4 No questions of fact were identified at the trial court level. 
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how Oltmanns' insurance policy would potentially apply. It was further undisputed that 
Fire Insurance, in conducting the investigation and evaluation, requested and received the 
summons and complaint filed against Oltmanns (Case No. 070700309), the rental 
companies' cross-claim against Oltmanns, a copy of the rental agreement for the personal ~ 
watercraft, and the deposition transcript of Robert Oltmanns, which detailed the facts of 
the July 2006 accident. 5 It was undisputed that Fire Insurance determined it needed a 
coverage analysis from outside counsel. It was undisputed that Fire Insurance sent the 
matter to outside counsel for a coverage opinion and relied, in good faith, on that 
coverage opinion in filing a declaratory judgment action. In addition, it was also 
undisputed that Oltmanns' insurance policy does not provide for attorney's fees for 
declaratory judgment actions. From these undisputed facts, Oltmanns failed to show that 
Fire Insurance breached the insurance contract or breached the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in any way. 
This conduct shows that Fire Insurance continually acted in good faith over the 
course of this claim. By thoroughly investigating the facts and fairly evaluating 
Oltmanns' claim, filing the declaratory judgment action over a fairly debatable issue, and 
ultimately accepting coverage and reimbursing Oltmanns for his defense costs and 
attorney's fees, Fire Insurance did not breach its contract with Oltmanns_ Nor did Fire 
Insurance breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, no reasonable 
minds can differ in concluding that Fire Insurance's conduct was reasonable as an 
5 This abrogated any need to Fire Insurance to obtain the registration of the watercraft. 
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objective matter when Fire Insurance investigated the facts, fairly evalu_ated the claim, 
and acted reasonably and promptly in filing the declaratory judgment action. In addition, 
no reasonable minds can differ in concluding that Oltmanns' claim was fairly debatable, 
given the research and analysis conducted by coverage counsel on the term ''jet skis" as 
contained in Oltmanns' insurance policy. Moreover, there is no reasonable probability 
that Oltmanns could prevail in the matter. See Jones, 2012 UT 52, ~ 8. The trial court is 
the fact finder in this case. The trial court used its discretion recognized by this Court in 
Callioux, Prince, and Jones and concluded that Fire Insurance acted reasonably as an 
objective matter. This conclusion will not change given the trial court is the trier of fact 
and the facts are undisputed. The facts the trial court relied on µi concluding Oltmanns' 
claim was fairly debatable would be the same facts the trial court would hear and rely on 
if this case were to advance to trial. Thus, there is no reasonable probability Oltmanns 
could prevail in this matter. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate and 
Oltmanns' claims were dismissed as a matter of law. 
B. Fire Insurance, In Good Faith, Reasonably Relied On The Coverage 
Opinion. 
Fire Insurance reasonably relied on the coverage opinion of counsel. 6 This is the 
same as the insurance company in Prince relying on a doctor's report regarding the 
treatment of the insured. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ~ 35, 56 P.3d 
524. Oltmanns takes issue with the coverage opinion, contending that the reasonableness 
of the insurer's conduct is synonymous with the quality of the counsel. See Pet'r's Br. 36. 
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However, Oltmanns provides no support, citation, or otherwise from any jurisdiction to 
support the proposition. The Court of Appeals was correct in concluding "an insurance 
... 
company may reasonably and fairly rely ... upon a coverage opinion from qualified 
outside counsel, received in the course of careful investigation and evaluation of a claim." ~ 
Oltmanns, 2016 UT App 54, iJ 15. Thus, the content of the analysis given by coverage 
counsel in the coverage opinion is relevant to show Fire Insurance's diligence in 
investigating the claim and its good faith decision to file a declaratory judgment action, 
not the declaratory action's ultimate success or failure. 
"An insurer may defend itself against allegations of bad faith and malice in claims 
handling with evidence the insurer relied on the advice of competent counsel." State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. App. 3d 721,725,279 Cal. Rptr. 
116, 117 (Ct. App. 1991), modified (Mar. 21, 1991). The defense of "advice of counsel" 
is offered to show the insurer had proper cause for its actions even if the advice it 
received is ultimately unsound or erroneous. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
Insurers often bring in an attorney to review a particular claim file 
to determine the claim's validity or to litigate the case on behalf of 
the insured. After reviewing the claim, the attorney may give his or 
her opinion regarding it and may advise the carrier on what action 
to take: whether to pay the claim or not. Such advice, if followed in 
good faith, may itself help immunize the insurer from tort liability. 
Obtaining and following an attorney's advice may tend to show that 
the insurer lacked an improper motive-or bad faith-in its 
conduct vis-a-vis the claim. 
16 Am. Jur. Proof of Pacts 3d 419 (Originally published in 1992). 
6 This should be considered to be a legal expert opinion. 
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Some courts have held that not following the advice of counsel is evidence of bad 
faith. See Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 250 Iowa 1123, 97 N.W.2d 168, (1959) 
( affirming the insurer was guilty of bad faith when it failed to accept and heed the 
recommendations of its own attorneys); see also Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co.~ 155 Cal. 
App. 2d 679,319 P.2d 69 (1957) (concluding the insurer's rejection of advice of its own 
attorney was evidence of bad faith). Jurisdictions throughout the country consider that 
when an insurer in good faith relies on the advice of counsel it is a defense to bad faith 
claims.7 
This Court held that the advice of counsel is a defense to a claim for malicious 
prosecution arising out of either an unsuccessful civil or criminal action, if the action was 
instituted in good faith in reliance on counsel's advice, given after a full and fair 
disclosure of the facts to counsel. Perkins v. Stephens, 503 P.2d 1212, 1213 (Utah 1972); 
see also Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P .2d 151 (Utah 1991) ("An accuser may 
justifiably rely on the advice of counsel ... "). There is "no significant distinction between 
malicious prosecution cases and insurance bad faith cases in the pleadings context." 
7 See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 228 Cal.App.3d 721, 725, 279 
Cal.Rptr. 116 (1991) (an insurance company's good faith reliance on advice of counsel negates 
allegations of bad faith); Szumigala v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 853 F.2d 274, 282 (5th 
Cir.1988) ("good-faith reliance upon advice of counsel may prevent imposition of punitive 
damages"); Western Line Consol. School Dist. v. Continental Cas. Co., 632 F.Supp. 295, 304 (N. 
D. Miss.1986) ("This court is persuaded that good faith reliance on the advice of counsel is in 
fact a defense to an award of punitive damages .... "); Chavers v. National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 
405 So.2d 1, 8 (Ala.1981) ( advice of counsel, while "not necessarily an absolute defense," is 
relevant to the bad faith issue); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trevethan, 390 So.2d 724, 728 
(Fla. App.1980) (holding ''that reliance on the advice of counsel is similarly evidence to be 
considered on the issue of bad faith). 
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Dalrymple v. United Services Auto. Assn., 40 Cal. App. 4th 497, 515, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
845, 854 (1995), as modified (Dec. 13, 1995) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, as in 
malicious prosecution cases, this Court should conclude that Fire Insurance's good faith 
reliance on coverage counsel's advice is a defense to Oltmanns' claim of bad faith, 
especially when the interpretation of the language of the insurance contract is fairly 
debatable. 
It is undisputed that Fire Insurance relied on coverage counsel to assist in making a 
coverage determination regarding the language of the insuring agreement. Fire Insurance 
thereafter followed the advice of counsel by filing a declaratory judgment action, rather 
than simply denying Oltmanns' claim. Oltmanns essentially reargues his memorandum in 
opposition to Fire Insurance's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the coverage 
issue which was filed in early 2010. R. 152-59. This is the same argument that was heard 
by the trial court in 2010 and then by the Court of Appeals. See Id. Oltmanns 
acknowledges that coverage counsel was qualified to render the coverage opinion. See 
Petitioner's Brief at 3 7. In addition, a review of the coverage opinion shows that the 
analysis was thorough. Even the Court of Appeals recognized coverage counsel's analysis 
was "quite a thorough coverage opinion." Oltmanns, 2016 UT App. 54, iJ 4. It must be 
noted, again, that the trial court in the declaratory judgment action did grant summary 
judgment for Fire Insurance on the coverage issue declaring that the ')et skis" exclusion 
applied to Oltmanns' accident and was not covered by the policy. This cannot be ignored 
and pushed aside because the trial court is the fact fmder in this matter as no demand for a 
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jury was made by either party and no jury fee was paid to the court. Moreover, coverage 
counsel's opinion was not misplaced in stating, "Unless the language of an insurance 
contract is ambiguous or unclear, the court must construe it according to its plain and 
ordinary meaning." R. 565. Even Oltmanns, in September 2006 after his accident, thought 
his homeowners policy did not cover the accident due to the "jet skis" exclusion. This is 
why he declined Sherrie Eichmeier' s off er to assist him in making a claim on his 
homeowners policy. Oltmanns believed he was operating a jet ski at the time the accident 
occurred. R. 564. Thus, Fire Insurance's reliance on coverage counsel was reasonable. 
There is no reasonable probability that Oltmanns can prevail in this matter as the trial 
court is the finder of fact in this case. Furthermore, Fire Insurance, heeding the advice of 
coverage counsel, acted in good faith in filing the declaratory judgment action on a fairly 
debatable claim. 
C. The Coverage Letter Was Offered To Show Fire Insurance Acted In 
Good Faith. 
Oltmanns objected to the coverage opinion in the trial court contending that the 
coverage opinion was inadmissible hearsay. "Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 
134, ,r 44,302 P.3d 844; see also Utah R. Evid. 80l(c). "Hearsay is generally 
inadmissible because the witness 'is acting as a conduit to relay' the personal knowledge 
or observations of others." Id. (quoting State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198,310 P.2d 388,390 
(1957)). However, Fire Insurance did not offer the coverage opinion to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted in the coverage opinion. Rather, Fire Insurance offered the coverage 
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opinion to show its effect on the hearer. See Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence 684 
(2012) (stating "statements may be relevant to the issues of any particular case because of 
their effect on the hearer."). In other words, Fire Insurance offered the coverage opinion 
to show that Fire Insurance reasonably relied on the coverage opinion and authorized the 
filing of the declaratory judgment action in good faith. 
In State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333 {Utah 1980), a theft by deception case, a 
promoter made an out-of-court statement to a financier "that financing was available." Id. 
at 33 7. The trial court excluded the statements as inadmissible hearsay. Id. The Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that"[ w ]hen an out-of-court statement is offered simply to 
prove that it was made, without regard to whether it is true, such testimony is not 
proscribed by the hearsay rule." Id. This Court continued stating, "Evidence of a 
statement by a third person is ... admissible, irrespective of the fact that it was made out 
of court, if it is offered to support a defense of good faith." Id. ( emphasis added). 
In Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App. 199, 29 P.3d 13, a mother failed to attend an 
order to show cause hearing. Id. at ,r 3. The trial court held her in contempt. Id. At the 
contempt hearing, the trial court excluded as hearsay the testimony of the mother that her 
out of state attorney told her that she did not need to attend the order to show cause 
hearing. Id. at ,r 16. The mother appealed the trial court's ruling. Id. The Utah Court of 
Appeals reversed concluding that the "Mother sought to introduce her conversation with 
her California counsel as proof of a good faith reason for not attending the hearing." Id. 
( emphasis added). Such testimony "was admissible to show a good faith defense." Id. 
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(emphasis added). Both of these cases show the effect the out of court statements had on 
the hearer. 
Just as in Sorenson and Barton, Fire Insurance introduced coverage counsel's 
opinion to show that Fire Insurance reasonably relied on the opinion and thereafter acted 
in good faith in filing a declaratory judgment action on the advice of counsel. The 
coverage opinion indicated that a general search of court cases found that many courts 
referred to various brands of personal watercrafts as jet skis. The coverage opinion also 
indicated that Wikipedia and Google showed that the term ''jet ski" was often used as a 
generic term for all personal watercraft. Based on the research regarding the term ''jet 
skis," coverage counsel believed that Fire Insurance had a 75% chance of prevailing in a 
declaratory judgment action. As a result, Fire Insurance authorized the filing of the 
declaratory relief action. 
Fire Insurance's good faith belief that a declaratory judgment action would be 
successful is not unfounded. In fact, the trial court initially granted summary judgment for 
Fire Insurance based on the same analysis and argument contained in the coverage 
opinion. This cannot be ignored as the Court of Appeals stated, "we find it very 
persuasive that the district court initially accepted Fire Insurance's theory and argument in 
this case, i.e., in the first round of judicial consideration, not only was there a debate, but 
Fire Insurance actually won the debate. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Oltmanns, 2016 UT App 54, ,r 
13, 370 P.3d 566. Thus, Fire Insurance reasonably relied on the coverage opinion from 
counsel in filing its declaratory judgment action. "Submitting the issue to a court for 
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interpretation in declaratory judgment action is a prudent, reasonable step toward the 
resolution of a legitimate dispute over a coverage term or exclusion." Id. ,r 15. Such 
action falls far short of bad faith. To conclude otherwise would be akin to concluding the 
insurer in Callioux committed bad faith by relying on a court's finding of probable cause 
that a fire was intentionally set by the insured in denying the insured' s claim. Likewise, to 
conclude that Fire Insurance committed bad faith by reasonably relying on coverage 
counsel's opinion and advice in filing a declaratory judgment action would be aldn to 
concluding the insurer in Prince committed bad faith by relying on an expert opinion of a 
doctor to deny an insurance claim. Such a conclusion would essentially abrogate the fairly 
debatable doctrine. Therefore, the trial court's conclusion and the Court of Appeals 
affirmation that Oltmanns' claim was fairly debatable as a matter of law was proper. As a 
result, Oltmanns' claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
fails as a matter of law and this Court should affirm. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REJECTED THE RULE 56(f) 
DECLARATION OF OLTMANNS' COUNSEL. 
The Court of Appeals declined to consider this issue, concluding that the term "jet 
ski" as used in Oltmanns's insurance policy presented a "fairly debatable" interpretation 
as a matter of law. Likewise, this Court should decline to consider this issue as there truly 
was a "fairly debatable" issue regarding the interpretation of the ''jet skis" term in the 
insurance policy. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Oltmanns, 2016 UT App 54, if 16 n.4, 370 P.3d 566. 
However, in the event the issue is considered, the district court properly rejected 
opposing counsel's Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(f) declaration. The declaration was filed after 
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discovery ended and even after the parties extended discovery. The declaration presented 
no facts. Rather the declaration only set forth the opinions of opposing counsel. Such 
opinions are not admissible evidence. 
Affidavits opposing a motion for summary judgment must "be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(e). "These requirements mirror those that apply to all evidence, and our case 
law on excluding affidavit evidence supports this." In re Gen. Determination of Rights to 
Use of All Water v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39,, 26,982 P.2d 65. Thus, trial 
courts have a "broad grant of discretion" in determining whether to strike an affidavit. Id. 
, 25. A trial court does not abuse this discretion when it strikes an affidavit that is 
"largely conclusory in form," or consists "entirely of inadmissible ... evidence." Norton 
v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). Also, affidavits should 
be disregarded when the party is "merely on a fishing expedition for purely speculative 
facts after substantial discovery has been conducted." Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 
745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). 
A. The Declaration Is Conclusory and Speculative. 
It is well established that affidavits that are "largely conclusory in form" are not 
"admissible in evidence and may not be considered on summary judgment under Rule 
56(e)." Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). The Declaration here was 
conclusory and was properly rejected. In response to Fire Insurance's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment, Oltmanns submitted the Declaration of Donald L. Dalton, Oltmanns' 
counsel. Throughout the Declaration, Mr. Dalton offered purely conclusory statements 
that were speculative at best. For example, Mr. Dalton stated in his affidavit that "It 
appears to have been based on dictum from the case." (R. at 682-84). These conclusory 
and speculative forms of statements appear throughout the Declaration. Mr. Dalton 
cannot be a witness for Oltmanns. Oltmanns, in bearing the burden of proof, did not 
identify any expert witness to opine about the coverage opinion. 
Mr. Dalton was simply making bald statements in an attempt to manufacture an 
issue of fact. However, coverage counsel's thought process regarding his analysis of the 
"jet skis" issue was not the question before the court and was immaterial. This was not 
allowed. Utah law is clear that "bald statements do not suffice to establish a genuine issue 
of material fact. In responding to defendants' motion for summary judgment, [Oltmanns 
was] required to set forth specific facts showing that there [was] a genuine issue for trial." 
Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24,133, 20 P.3d 876 (citations omitted). In Utah, "a party 
puts the legitimacy of a fact, supported by affidavits ... , in dispute by presenting equally 
meaningful, sworn testimony in the form of affidavits .... " Johnson v. Hermes 
Associates, Ltd., 2005 UT 82,121, 128 P.3d 1151. As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, 
the purpose of the requirement in Rule 56( e) that an adverse party must set forth specific 
facts "is not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory 
allegations of an affidavit." Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). 
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Thus, the Declaration is not "equally meaningful, sworn testimony'' and was properly 
rejected. 
B. The Declaration Does Not Conform to Rule 56(f). 
The Declaration does not conform to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). Mr. Dalton set forth 
the Declaration as a means to further discovery by taking the deposition of coverage 
counsel. However, fact discovery ended and Mr. Dalton chose not to take the deposition 
of coverage counsel. 
Rule 56(f) provides that, a party opposing summary judgment may submit an 
affidavit stating the reasons why he is presently unable to present evidentiary affidavits 
essential to support his opposition to summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f); see 
also Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A 
commentator has succinctly described the Rule 56( f) standard: 
The mere averment of exclusive lmowledge or control of the facts by the 
moving party is not adequate: the opposing party must show to the best 
of his ability what facts are within the movant's exclusive knowledge or 
control; what steps have been taken to obtain the desired information 
pursuant to discovery procedures under the Rules; and that he is desirous 
of taking advantage of these discovery procedures. 
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 840 quoting 2 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal 
Practice par. 56.24 (2d ed. 1987). 
In Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 312-14 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court 
delineated several factors to consider under Rule 56(f): (1) Were the reasons articulated in 
the Rule 56(f) affidavit "adequate" or is the party against whom summary judgment is 
sought merely on a "fishing expedition" for purely speculative facts after substantial 
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discovery has been conducted without producing any significant evidence? (2) Was there 
sufficient time since the inception of the lawsuit for the party against whom the summary 
judgment is sought to use discovery procedures, and thereby cross-examine the moving 
party? (3) If discovery procedures were timely initiated, was the non-moving party 
afforded an appropriate response? Id. at 312-14. 
Although the courts recognize that this requirement should be applied liberally, the 
courts are also unwilling to "spare the litigants from their own lack of diligence." 
Callioux, 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). In Callioux, a case 
directly on point, the court was presented with the same situation that the party opposing 
summary judgment wanted to conduct further discovery and asked for a continuance 
pursuant to Rule 56(f). Id. at 840. In applying the forgoing legal principles, the court in 
Callioux denied the motion for continued discovery, concluding that the party opposing 
summary judgment was afforded ample time to conduct the discovery sought. Id. at 841. 
Like the motion for continuance in Callioux, Oltmanns made " a conclusory claim 
of need for further discovery, but [the Declaration] was not accompanied by the required 
Rule 56(f) affidavit setting forth the reasons why [he] could not present facts essential to 
justify [his] opposition .... " Id. (internal citations omitted). The court of appeals further 
concluded that the "conclusory assertion that the scheduled depositions were "expected to 
produce matters essential to resolution of defendant's motion" smacks of a "fishing 
expedition" for purely speculative facts. Id. Likewise, Oltmanns' Declaration for wanting 
to depose coverage counsel smacks as a fishing expedition. This was based upon the 
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purely speculative facts declared by Mr. Dalton in his Declaration. Furthermore, in 
Cal/ioux, the court of appeals concluded the district court correctly denied the motion for 
continued discovery because the party opposing summary judgment had been afforded 
ample opportunity to discover and present evidence in opposition to Progressive's motion 
for summary judgment. Id. The same is true for Oltmanns. Oltmanns had ample time to 
discover and present evidence through depositions. In fact, Oltmanns was in possession 
of coverage opinion from the very beginning of fact discovery. Nothing in the Declaration 
showed that Oltmanns was conscientious about pursuing the deposition of coverage 
counsel. Rather, Oltmanns chose not to take any depositions in this matter to try to prove 
his case. This is clearly why Mr. Dalton failed to address in his Declaration what steps 
were taken to obtain the desired information pursuant to discovery procedures under the 
Rules in accordance with Rule 56(f). To declare that the deposition of coverage counsel 
was necessary was untimely, conclusory, and based upon purely speculative facts. Thus, 
the trial court properly rejected the Declaration and denied Oltmanns' request to depose 
coverage counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no reasonable probability that Oltmanns can prevail in this matter. The 
trial court is the fact finder. The facts are undisputed. The trial court properly granted Fire 
Insurance's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed. 
Oltmanns' claim relating to the 2006 accident was fairly debatable as a matter oflaw. Fire 
~ 
Insurance reasonably relied on coverage counsel's opinion and advice. This was done in 
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good faith and is undisputed. As a result, Oltmanns' claims for breach of contract and 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fail as a matter of law. 
Opposing counsel's declaration was improper and created no issue of material fact. The 
trial court properly rejected the Rule 56(f) declaration. Therefore, the trial court's October 
10, 2014, order granting summary judgment should be affirmed. For these reasons, the 
trial court's order of dismissal as to all issues presented on appeal should be affirmed by 
this Court, as was done by the Court of Appeals. 
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